I. The Dialectical Dimension
Chapter 1. Informal Logic and the Dialectical Approach
to Argument
Douglas Walton and David M. Godden
Johnson and Blair first acknowledged the importance of
the dialectical dimensions of argument in 1987 but more recently reject the
position that all arguments should be modeled as dialogues.
Chapter 2. Progress without Regress on the DialecticalT
ier
James B. Freeman
Arguments can be appraised on Johnson’s dialectical
tier without infinite regress (Govier’s objection) if only salient
objections are considered.
Chapter 3. Coming to Grips with Strategic Maneuvering
in Argumentative Practice
Frans H. van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser
How one combines strategic maneuvering to achieve a
maximum rhetorical benefit (i.e. persuasion) with observing norms of
reasonableness in such argumentative activity as adjudication, mediation,
and negotiation.
Chapter 4. Nothing but Objections!
Erik C. W. Krabbe
Identifies strong objection as one of several critical
reactions to an argument, and considers what dialogue rules would determine
when objections were considered too little or too much.
Chapter 5. The Burden of Proof: A Macro or Micro Level
Concept”
Fred Kauffeld
Application so stretches the concept that “instead of
talking about The Burden of Proof we should investigate how various
probative obligations are incurred, distributed, discharged, realized,
evaded, etc., in argumentative discourses and exchanges.”
Chapter 6. Robert C. Pinto
Burdens of Rejoinder
Examines conditions under which a disputant may incur a
burden of rejoinder, or of responding to an objection.
II. The Nature and Scope of Argument
Chapter 7. A Perspective on Truth
Mark Weinstein
The tension in argumentation and informal logic between
truth as acceptability and truth as persuasion might be mitigated with truth
in the physical sciences as a paradigm.
Chapter 8. Reason Appreciation
Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby
In critical thinking the concept of appreciating reason
needs to be fleshed out with a deeper d
Chapter 9. Mill on Liberty of Argument: A Dialectical
Approach
Maurice A. Finocchiaro
Applies the Johnson/Blair distinction in argument of an
illative core and dialectical tier to a close analysis of J.S. Mill’s
argument for freedom of speech in Chapter 2 of “On Liberty.”
Chapter 10. Beyond Words: Two Dogmas of Informal Logic
Leo Groarke
We should not prioritize verbal over visual arguments,
nor should we reduce the latter to the former. Fuller information can be
conveyed more effectively and precisely in visual form.
Chapter 11. On Fallacy
Christopher W. Tindale
Relates the basic types of fallacy identified by
Johnson & Blair (irrelevant reason, hasty conclusion, and problematic
premise) to their general definition of fallacy.
Chapter 12. Considering Questions about Questions
Trudy Govier
Distinguishes the fallacy of complex question (many
questions) from other troublesome uses of questions.
Chapter 13. Is There an Argumentum Ad Hominem Fallacy?
David Hitchcock
Prior to the 20th century “ad hominem” did
not designate a fallacy; cases of ad hominem today are either legitimate
moves in controversy or not reasoning, so there is no ad hominem fallacy.
Chapter 14. Conversation and Dissemblance
Jonathan E Adler
A position can be presented so as to conceal a dubious
presupposition. The Bible Code author
claims the Bible predicts Rabin’s assassination
in 1995, but the more improbable prediction is that an individual Itzak
Rabin would exist in 1995.
Chapter 15. Multiculturalism and Argumentative Norms
Harvey Siegel
A strong multiculturalism is incoherent according to
Fish for having to tolerate intolerance, but Siegel rejoins it can remain
coherent by embracing different cultures only to the point of their
intolerance.
Chapter 16. Informal Logic and Intersectionality
Michael A Gilbert
Informal logic must reach out to non-traditional groups
with more elastic concepts of rationality and consistency.
Chapter 17. ‘Probable’ and Its Equivalents
Robert H. Ennis
Examines how “probable” functions in informal logic: to
say “it is probable that P” is to affirm a guarded commitment to P.
Chapter 18. Should We Legalize Bayes’ Theorem?
John Woods
The theorem cannot apply to jury deliberations because
it entails viewing the evidence from the presumption of guilt. The law does
not allow this.
Chapter 19. Unanswerable Questions and Unknowable Facts
Nicholas Rescher
Since our language resources are finite and we can
assume an infinite number of facts, there will always be unknowable facts,
e.g an ever unstated theory or a never identified culprit.
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