Chapter One: Reconstructing the structure of argumentation:
According to pragma-dialectical theory, argumentation is always
part of an explicit or implicit dialogue in which one party attempts to convince the other
party of the acceptability of his standpoint. In a fully explicit dialogue, the antagonist
expresses his doubts and criticisms unequivocally, and all these doubts and criticisms
must be answered by the protagonist by advancing more argumentation. In an implicit
dialogue where the antagonist is silent, the protagonist can only anticipate the
antagonists doubts or criticism; he will only advance more argumentation if he
assumes that doubts or criticism are to be expected. In a dialogical approach to
argumentation, the discussion character of the proceedings is deemed to be reflected in
the structure of the argumentation. The protagonists argumentation is then seen as a
complex whole made up of statements put forward to deal with real or anticipated critical
reactions from an antagonist.
Chapter Five: Exploiting pragmatic clues:
In what way can modalities be indicative of the structure of the
arguers argumentation? If an arguer has qualified his standpoint with a modality, he
provides information about the degree to which he has committed himself to the
propositional content of the expressed opinion. This information enables the analyst to
determine what degree of justificatory or refutatory potential the argumentation should
have, in order to lend sufficient support to the standpoint. If the argumentation consists
of more than one argument, in order to determine which structure is to be attributed to
the argumentation, the analyst has to judge whether each individual argument is sufficient
to support the standpoint with the claimed strength, or whether the arguments only have
sufficient weight if they are combined. He can make a decision about this only if he takes
two factors into account: the force of the standpoint and the weight of the arguments. For
this reason, it is clear that the presence of a modality is not in itself a sufficient
justification for combining, or linking, the arguments that are advanced.
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