This paper develops the ideas of rhetorical psychology by applying them to some basic Freudian concepts. In so doing, the paper considers whether there might be a "Dialogic Unconscious." So far rhetorical psychology has tended to concentrate upon conscious thought rather than on the unconscious. It has suggested that thinking is modeled on argument and dialogue, and that rhetoric provides the means of opening up matters for thought and discussion. However, rhetoric may also provide the means for closing down topics and, thereby, provide the means of repression. It will be suggested that language is not merely expressive but it is also repressive. Moreover, the repressive aspects of language are built into the very practices of dialogue. In learning language, we learn the codes for socially appropriate ways of speaking. These must be acquired as habits, so that we learn to repress routinely the desire to transgress the codes of appropriate speech. Thus, the routine use of language provides the resources for repression. If language is repressive, then this applies equally to the language of psycho-analysis itself. Freud's famous case histories, such as that of Dora, can be re-examined, in order to see what Freud's own theory of repression was itself repressing.

Sally Jackson, Professor of Communication
University of Arizona
"Disputation by Design"

In normative pragmatics (a kind of empirical discourse analysis organized by normative theory) the analysis of any communication process begins with an idealized model of the discourse that can be compared with actual practices. Idealizations of argumentation can be found, among other places, in theoretical descriptions of 'critical discussions' and other dialogue types. Comparing models with actual practices can identify defects in the models (leading to theoretical refinements), but it can also identify deficiencies in practice. This latter possibility invites redesign around well-justified idealizations. This paper outlines an approach to the design of discourse processes and illustrates the approach with contrastive analysis of several recently developed protocols for discussion and debate on the World Wide Web.

Nicholas Rescher, University Professor
University of Pittsburgh
"The Role of Rhetoric in Rational Argumentation"

The structure of this discussion will be tripartite. First, it will set out a way of distinguishing between rhetoric and strictly rational argumentation. Next, it will consider some of the ramifications of this proposed way of looking at the matter—in particular what its implications are for rationality and for rhetoric, respectively. Finally, it examines how this perspective bears on the project of philosophizing. The paper's ultimate aim, accordingly, is to consider what light such an analysis can shed upon philosophy and philosophizing.

Andrew Aberdein (Logic and Metaphysics, St. Andrews)
"Persuasive Definition"

Charles Stevenson introduced the term 'persuasive definition' to describe a suspect form of moral argument 'which gives a new conceptual meaning to a familiar word without substantially changing its emotive meaning.' However, as Stevenson acknowledges, such a move can be employed legitimately. If persuasive definition is to be a useful notion, we shall need a criterion for identifying specifically illegitimate usage. I criticize a recent proposed criterion from Keith Burgess-Jackson and offer an alternative. I conclude by extending the argument to non-moral discourse.

Jonathan Adler (Philosophy, Brooklyn College & Graduate Center—CUNY)
"Arguing from Ignorance"

Arguments from ignorance should be schematized: It has not been proven false that p. So it is possible that p. So, it is reasonable to believe p. Also, in opposition to standard views they should be distinguished from burden of proof and absence of evidence arguments. Much of the persuasiveness of such arguments can be located in the slippery uses of "possible." Besides equivocations on "possible" the argument is a fallacy for two reasons. First, the possibility implied by the first premise does not yield the serious possibility that is needed for establishing the conclusion. Second, ignorance is never sufficient reason for belief, only adequate evidence.

Derek Allen (Philosophy, Toronto)
"Should We Assess the Basic Premises of an Argument for Truth or Acceptability?"

Nowadays it seems to be pretty widely held among argumentation theorists that for an argument to be a good, its basic premises must be acceptable, but need not be true. Whether or not this orthodoxy (or quasi-orthodoxy) is correct is an issue for argumentation theory. This paper considers arguments for and against it, and responds to criticisms received of a paper I read at the Third ISSA conference (Amsterdam, 1994)—a paper in which I had the temerity to defend the old-fashioned view that for an argument to be a good, its basic premises must be true.

Jeremy Bailenson and Lance J. Rips (Psychology, Northwestern)
"Claim Strength and Burden of Proof"

In this paper, we report results from experiments in which people read conversational arguments and then judge (a) the convincingness of each claim, and (b) the individual speaker's burden of proof. The results showed an "anti-primacy" effect: People judge the speaker who makes the first claim as having greater burden of proof. This effect persists even when each speaker's claims are rated equally convincing. We also find that people rate claims less convincing when they appear in the first part of an argument than when they appear in isolation.

J. Anthony Blair (Philosophy, Windsor)
"The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument"

The paper starts from scepticism that all argumentation is dialogical or that all dialogue types are argumentation. The hypothesis is that the concepts of dialectic and dialogue are not isomorphic, at least as applied to argumentation. The paper will cover: (a) a review of the conceptions of dialectic and of dialogue in the argumentation literature; (b) an analysis of these concepts; (c) a critical assessment of the limits of the discussion or dialogue as a model for argumentation; (d) a discussion of alternative models of argumentation; and (e) an exploration of the implications of the proposed models for the relation between argument and rhetoric.

George Boger (Philosophy, Canisius)
"Aristotle's Treatment of Fallacious Reasoning in Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics"

Aristotle studies syllogistic argumentation in Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics. In the latter, he focuses on the formal and syntactic character of arguments and treats the sullogismoi and non-sullogismoi as argument patterns with valid or invalid instances. In the former, Aristotle focuses on semantics and rhetoric to study apparent sullogismoi as object language arguments. Interpreters usually take Sophistical Refutations as considerably less mature than Prior Analytics. Our interpretation holds that the two works are more of a piece than previously believed and, indeed, that Aristotle's treatment of fallacious reasoning presupposes the results of the formal theory.

Leah Bradshaw (Politics, Brock)
"Emotions, Reasons and Judgment"

The paper considers an influential current in contemporary philosophy: the notion that judgments are formed as a consequence of emotive reaction. Philosophers such as Richard Rorty and Martha Nussbaum argue that moral and political principles, such as universal human rights and inherent human dignity, owe their persuasiveness to emotional responses of natural compassion and pity. Reason is accorded a secondary place as a justificatory apparatus for sentience. The paper aims to demonstrate both the incoherence and the political danger of this philosophical approach to judgment.

M. Neil Browne (Economics, Bowling Green), Terri J. Keeley (Virginia), and W. J. Hiers (Cornell)
"The Rhetorical Burden of Expert Witnesses"

When judges and juries hear from expert witnesses, what exactly do they expect to hear? In other words, as an audience, what purpose do they have for the communication? Just what rhetorical burden is the expert expected to bear? The theme of our paper is that the Frye and Daubert rules that dominate legal argument about the use of expert witnesses are both flawed. Neither shows adequate respect either for what Billig calls "the argumentative aspect of social life" or the inescapable hermeneutic and perspectival problems highlighted by the rhetoric-of-the-human-sciences movement.

M. Neil Browne (Economics, Bowling Green) and R. G. Hausmann (Honors Program, Bowling Green)
"Argument as an Act of Friendship"

Those who are said to argue are typically seen as annoying, domineering types who treat conversation as a duel in which the goal is in the words of Gerry Spence's recent bestseller, "to win every time." The most immediate manifestation of this resistance to argument as both inescapable and healthful comes from our students; even when they learn to appreciate and evaluate tropes at an advanced level, they still often wonder aloud, "Should I engage openly in argument?" This paper aspires to paste a happy face on the practice of argument as a partial antidote to this resistance.

Patrick Clauss (English, Ball State)
"Eunoia on the Internet?: Usenet Newsgroups and the Subversion of Rationality"

Using Edward Damer's discussion of effective argumentation principles and Douglas Walton's discussion of argumentation dialogues, I consider arguments from several Usenet newsgroups, the largest collection of Internet discussion groups. In unmoderated newsgroups, participants can engage in open discussions and debates. However, with no central authority, the argumentation in many Usenet groups often degenerates into anarchy. Presenting examples where participants ignore standards of rational conduct and subvert attempts at goal-directed argumentation, I raise questions about the rhetorical nature of an unstructured discourse community. I also consider what the examples reveal about spontaneous argumentation and electronic communication.

Dan Cohen (Philosophy, Colby)
"The Argument Against Rhetoric (Or: Proof Shall Make You Free)"

The rhetoric of logic reveals, we claim, that arguments are about force, ending only when one side submits. Rhetoricians, it is countered, are content to persuade, settling for agreement when truth is wanted—and all is fair in pursuit of consent. The choice between conceptual rape and seduction is a false choice. It is time to cut against the grain. We are distracted by the rhetoric of logic and gloss the logic of rhetoric. Rhetorical models for pluralistic discourses are vital, but fail as regulative ideals. The ideology of logic's rhetoric is unacceptable, but it is not immutable—so there may be a way out.

Inga Dolinina and Vikki Cecchetto (Modern Languages, McMaster)
"Facework and Rhetorical Strategies in Intercultural Argumentative Discourse"

Incommensurability can arise in discourse for reasons varying from incomparability of theoretical frameworks to incomparability of cultural expectations. When it arises, common grounds for communication need to be worked out if communication is to take place at all, or have positive results. Intercultural discourse thus adds a dimension—facework of "politeness strategies"—to any model of argumentation. This dimension provides information about the "power/hierarchy relations" between the interlocutors and establishes which politeness strategies are acceptable for them, which in turn determine the usage of language forms, the choice of linguistic behaviour, and the appropriate rhetorical strategies: deductive or inductive.

Michael G. Dzialo (English, Yale)
"Legal and Philosophical Fictions: At the Line Where the Two Become One"

Anti-foundationalism is a central topic in recent legal scholarship. This scholarship has overlooked, however, the degree to which the debate between traditional legal determinacy and anti-foundational indeterminacy is yet another manifestation of a continuous debate in Western thought—one with its roots in pre-Socratic rhetoric. My presentation traces the indeterminacy thesis back to the contest of ideas between Protagoras and Plato. I contend that taking Protagorean notions seriously—perhaps even more seriously than self-avowed anti-foundationalists customarily do—leads, paradoxically, to a modified endorsement of foundationalism that is nevertheless wholly consistent with the Protagorean project.

James G. Edwards (Philosophy, Indiana)
"Pathological Circularity: Deductive Validity and a Contextual Account of the Fallacy of Begging the Question"

The purpose of this study is to provide an account of the fallaciousness of begging the question without thereby indicting as fallacious all otherwise acceptable deductively valid reasoning. The solution that we suggest exploits the intuition that all good arguments are weakly circular. The fallaciousness of begging the question is not that the reasoning is circular simpliciter. Rather, begging the question is a fallacy because the conclusion relies on an undischarged assumption that the audience cannot accept without further argumentation. In the face of such an argument the arguer might just as well have merely asserted the conclusion.

Maged El Komos (Academic Skills & Cultural Studies, Trent)
"Perelman as Educational Facilitator: the Realm of Rhetoric and the Acquisition of Rational Discourse"

The paper examines Chaim Perelman's rehabilitation and enlargement of rhetoric in the context of recent insights regarding the essential rhetoricity of thought. It then discusses some ways in which such rehabilitation and enlargement enable, in a manner that is perhaps the least coercive or dispossessing, a means of instruction geared to students' acquisition of rational discourse and of concomitant capacities for comprehension and persuasive expression expected in the academic community.

Eveline T. Feteris (Speech Communication, Amsterdam)
"The Soundness of Pragmatic Argumentation: Does the End Justify the Means?"

This paper addresses a specific form of argumentation, pragmatic argumentation, in which a certain action, choice or decision is justified by referring to the favourable consequences of the action (and the unfavourable consequences of the alternative action). The paper starts with a survey of the ideas on legal argumentation developed in argumentation theory, analytical philosophy and legal theory. The various ideas are brought together in a pragma-dialectical perspective in order to give a systematic survey of the various conceptions of pragmatic argumentation and to decide which further lines of research must be developed.

Linda Fisher (Philosophy, Windsor)
"Is Reasoning Gendered?"

The relevance of feminism for argumentation has been the subject of lively debates recently. I explore the viability of applying feminist categories to argumentation with a focus on the relevance of gender in reasoning and rationality. Arguing from the view that particular practices of reasoning are gendered, as operating within a gendered socio-political context, I examine the implications of conditioned reasoning for a conception of reason. Are reasoning and rationality in some fundamental sense conditioned, e.g., gendered? I argue for a conceptualization of reason as a structural complex whose character can be conditioned yet is non-relativistic.

David Fleming (English, New Mexico State)
"Housing Rhetoric: Argumentation and City Planning"

Urban design is "rhetorical" in the sense that it involves value-laden, socially-situated, reason-giving discourse. But it may be "rhetorical" in another sense as well. The design of urban and regional space is, implicitly and explicitly, the design of a community's discursive life. The way we shape our public geography, in other words, enables and constrains the kinds of arguments that get produced there. In this paper I explore several different approaches to urban design from the perspective of argument theory and analyze the implicit "rhetoric" of a downtown revitalization plan.

James B. Freeman (Philosophy, Hunter College, CUNY)
"What Types of Statements are There?"

"That apple means that Horatio loves Ophelia" seems controversial, while "There is a red apple on the window sill" does not. Explaining why involves recognizing that the first statement is an interpretation while the second is a description. But this raises the rhetorical issue of distinguishing types of statements. However, different rhetoricians give different typologies of statements. Proposed criteria involve serious philosophical difficulties. Building on the work of Sproule, Fahnestock and Secor, Kruger, we divide statements into descriptions, interpretations, evaluations, and necessary statements, giving a philosophical explication of these distinctions.

Michael A. Gilbert (Philosophy, York)
"Prolegomenon to a Pragmatics of Emotion"

This paper begins the development of a pragmatics of emotion based on the pragma-dialectical programme, Externalization, Socialization, Functionalization, and Dialectification, applied to the emotional mode of argumentation. The first step points out a systematic equivocation within pragma-dialectics between the notion of argument and that of 'dialectics.' With this cleared, it is shown that each of the first three main assumptions can be altered to accommodate a non-logical mode of communication. However, dialectification, insofar as it is actually defining of the dialectical mode, must be created anew. A defining assumption for emotionality is presented as a replacement for dialectification.

Rod Girle (Philosophy, Auckland)
"Belief Sets and Commitment Stores"

We compare central elements of Dialogue Logic and Belief Revision theory. Dialogue Logic assigns a commitment store to each dialogue participant. Changes in commitment stores are governed by rules for additions and withdrawals of belief. Withdrawal is one major source of difficulty. Belief Revision theory concerns the addition (expansion) and loss (contraction) of beliefs of ideal believers. Revision is where new beliefs, inconsistent with present beliefs, are added to a belief set by contracting beliefs which conflict with the new belief. Contraction is the major source of difficulty. We compare withdrawal and contraction.

Jean Goodwin (Communication Studies, Northwestern)
"Forms of Authority and the Real Argumentum ad Verecundiam"

We ordinarily distinguish between the authority exercised by an expert and that exercised by a commander. Nevertheless, prior argumentation theorists have been unable to articulate fully the grounds on which we make this distinction. In this paper, I propose a principle for distinguishing types of authorities. I argue further that on this principle, Locke's argumentum ad verecundiam represents a third type, reducible neither to command nor expertise. Finally, I point to significant instances of this third appeal to authority, especially in Roman legal and political discourse.

Jill Gordon (Philosophy, Colby)
"Why Didn't Plato Just Write Arguments? The Role of Image-Making in the Dialogues"

Several of Plato's dialogues seem to question the moral and epistemic value of image-making. Yet Plato's own word-images are powerful and alluring. I reconsider a conception of "Platonic" metaphysics in which the visible is denigrated relative to the purely intelligible, and in which only the latter can be an avenue to philosophical enlightenment. Viewing the apparent criticisms of image-making in the context of Plato's own use of images, I argue that his use of images can and does lead to philosophical enlightenment and that images are necessary, in addition to logico-deductive reasoning, because of human limitation.

Matthew Gorman (Philosophy, Toronto)
"Does Socrates Engage in Socratic Argumentation?"

In Plato's Gorgias Socratic dialectic progresses beyond its earlier, adversarial refutative form to a new "cooperative" Socratic argumentation which (allegedly) leads to truth and knowledge. Socrates there outlines certain preliminary conditions underlying such positive talk-exchanges, prior attitudes and commitments required of his interlocutors in order for their discourse to be able to produce genuine, reasoned, mutual agreements. I use van Eemeren and Grootendorst's general views as a framework for identifying these preliminary conditions, and then consider whether Socrates himself meets his own standards as a legitimate participant in genuine Socratic argumentation.

Trudy Govier (Calgary, Alberta)
"Arguing Forever? Or: Two Tiers of Argument Appraisal"

In this paper I explore Ralph Johnson's proposal that in addition to premises and conclusion every argument should have a dialectical tier in which the arguer addresses objections to the argument, and considers alternative positions. After exploring several reasons for thinking Johnson's proposal is a good one, I then raise a number of objections against it and move ahead to respond to those objections, which I do by distinguishing making out a case for a conclusion from offering an argument for it, and distinguishing supplementary arguments (responding to objections and considering alternative positions) from one's main argument. I contend that it is not realistic to see arguers as having and obligation to respond to all objections and to address all alternative positions; we must somehow discriminate those which need and merit a reply from those which do not. And this is a difficult task.

Claude Gratton (Philosophy, Sudbury)
"Infinite Regress of Recurring Questions and Answers"

I examine a number of infinite regress arguments whose infinite regresses are presented or described in terms of recurring questions and answers in order to determine whether such recurring questions have any role in generating these infinite regresses, or in disqualifying the recurring answers. I argue that despite the existence of such infinite regress arguments and the suggestions of some philosophers, these recurring questions have no such roles. Some ways of handling these infinite regress arguments are then proposed.

Albert W. Halsall (French & Centre for Rhetorical Studies, Carleton)
"The Topics in Classical and Modern Theories of Interpretation"

The purpose is to discuss some of the results and problems presented by the study of the topics between Aristotle's work and the treatment of them by Perelman and his followers. For instance, the method whereby classical and modern rhetorical theorists connect figurative language with techniques of persuasion consists in proposing that there exists a restricted number of "universal" argumentative strategies. Until the Renaissance, text producers and receivers shared a common knowledge of such argumentative procedures. In the twentieth century, Perelman and others have re-conceived the topics making up the "New Rhetoric's" argumentative function, as comparison of the two systems reveals.

Calvin Hayes (History, Brock)
"Popper's Critical Rationalism and the Rationale for Pragma-Dialectics"

My focus will be on the rationale van Eemeren and Grootendorst offer for their theory of Pragma-Dialectics. I will discuss their claims regarding deductivism, the omni-competence of Pragma-Dialectics (values, for example), rules of method, and their rejection of geometrical as well as anthropological approaches.I will criticize the rationale offered for Pragma-Dialectics and finish by offering what I think is needed as a supplement for a complete theory of argumentation. This is a set of default principles that solves the problem of establishing a non-arbitrary starting point that is simultaneously undogmatic yet foundational.

Darrin Hicks (Human Communication, Denver)
"Subjectivity and Governance in Procedural Theories of Argument"

In this essay I want to extend the brief discussion of "higher-order" conditions presented in Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs, 1993). After a brief discussion of the scope and function of higher-order conditions, I will examine the modes of subjectivity entailed in their description of the ideal arguer. I will then move to a discussion of the relationship between governance and rationality underwriting their description of the socio-political environment conducive to critical discussion. I will conclude the essay with remarks on the role of procedural theories of argumentation in a deliberative conception of democracy.

David Hitchcock (Philosophy, McMaster)
"Enumerative Induction"

Suppose you have a jar which contains 50 marbles, whose colour you don't know. You pick out one marble at a time, selecting at random without replacement. Each of the first 49 marbles is blue. You are about to pick out the last marble. How likely is it that this marble will also be blue? This example was the subject of a controversy some years ago between Stephen Thomas and John Nolt. Reflection on the controversy, and the example, shows that most of the things contemporary logic texts say about such enumerative inductions are false.

William Hughes (Philosophy, Guelph)
"Why Ethics Should be on the Critical Thinking Syllabus"

Critical thinking texts typically treat ethical reasoning as being in principle no different from non-moral types of reasoning. I argue that there are two distinct types of argument—those which appeal to principles of right and wrong conduct, and those which appeal to consequences—and that they cannot be properly understood or assessed on the basis of non-ethical models of reasoning. The failure to recognize this produces a simplistic understanding of ethical reasoning and contributes to the view that ethical judgments are mere expressions of personal feelings.

Dale Jacquette (Philosophy, Penn State)
"On the Relation of Informal to Formal Logic"

The distinction between formal and informal logic should be clarified as a prelude to considering their actual and ideal relations. Aristotle's syllogistic describes forms of valid inference, and is in that sense a formal logic. Yet the square of opposition and rules of middle term distribution and positive and negative propositions are standardly received as devices of so-called informal logic and critical reasoning. I propose a more exact criterion for distinguishing between formal and informal logic, and then defend a model for the most fruitful interaction between informal and formal methods of investigating and critically assessing the logic of arguments.

Ralph H. Johnson (Philosophy, Windsor)
"Differences Between Argumentative and Rhetorical Space"

The issue addressed is the age-old problem of the relationship between Logic and Rhetoric and, specifically, the question: how do Logic and Rhetoric differ in their approaches to the study of argumentation? What makes this question timely and appropriate is that Logic has recently undergone some important transformations. This paper develops the idea that an argument is the central event in 'argumentative space.' I present a conception of argumentative space as a subspace within rational space and seek to provide a rough characterization of the main features of argumentative space as understood by both Informal Logic and by Rhetoric.

Fred Kauffeld (Communication Arts, Edgewood)
"Presumptions and the Distribution of Argumentative Burdens in Acts of Proposing and Accusing"

This paper joins the voices warning against hasty transference of legal concepts of presumption to other kinds of argumentation, especially to deliberation about future acts and policies. Comparison of the pragmatics which respectively constitute the illocutionary acts of ACCUSING and PROPOSING reveals striking differences in the ways presumptions prompt accusers and proposers to undertake probative responsibilities and, also, points to corresponding differences in their probative duties. This comparison highlights significant contrasts between the way presumptions figure in legal reasoning as opposed to deliberation; the comparison also raises theoretically important questions about the norms governing persuasive argumentation. This paper is based on a broadly Gricean account of speech acts.

Harm Kloosterhuis (Law, Erasmus)
"The Reconstruction of Legal Analogy-Argumentation: Monological and Dialogical Approaches"

This paper deals with the rational reconstruction of analogy argumentation in judicial decisions. I describe, analyse and explain the elements of analogy-argumentation advanced in the justification of legal decisions, explore the criteria for the assessment of this type of argumentation, relate it to the general theory of law—all within the framework of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation. I will examine the problems that may arise when analysing this type of reasoning and discuss two perspectives in dealing with this problem. In doing this, I will show how use and reconstruction of analogy argumentation are interrelated.

Robert A. Kominar (Law and Justice, Laurentian)
"Rhetoric or Argument: The Rational Culture of Alternative Dispute Resolution"

If some have conceptualized law as a culture of argument, then perhaps ADR is a culture of rhetoric. Judges facilitate rational argumentation during trials. Mediators and arbitrators sometimes seem to glory in their sophistic lineage. As the attractiveness of mediation increases, it is worth pausing to consider whether these perspectives on ADR are warranted. There is some truth to fears about potential abuse of power in mediation. Would the culture of argument improve it? Those engaged in "transformational mediation," I argue, can accommodate such concerns and facilitate understanding of the proper role of argumentation in dispute resolution processes.

Erik C. W. Krabbe (Philosophy, Groningen)
"Who is Afraid of Figure of Speech?"

Aristotle's examples of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are not very convincing to the modern reader. Most fallacy theorists have been happy to omit this fallacy from their accounts. But a study of Figure of Speech will lead one to find connections with twentieth-century analytical philosophy, where the idea that the apparent form of a sentence need not be its real logical form has been prominent. Other interesting issues concern the boundary between ambiguity and invalidity and the use of profiles of dialogue to describe the dialectics of this fallacy.

Ingrid Makus (Politics, Brock)
"Feminist Reasoning About Reason"

This paper examines feminist concerns that reason and reasoning, as they are described and practiced in the Western tradition of political philosophy, are 'masculinist constructs' aiming at 'masculinist concerns'—the pursuit of knowledge and truth. 'Feminists of difference' suggest that there is a woman's way of arriving at knowledge and truth which is not captured by traditional western exposition. 'Post-modern' or 'post-structuralist feminists' criticize the pursuit of knowledge and truth itself as a 'will to power.' Do these arguments reinforce, challenge or provide alternatives to the constructs they criticize?

Gwen C. Mathewson (English, Washington)
"Outdoing Lewis Carrol: Judicial Rhetoric and Acceptable Fictions"

This paper examines the functions of narrative within written legal argumentation. My purposes are these: 1) to repudiate common assumptions that differentiate "argumentation" and "storytelling" in the law; 2) to begin to theorize anew how legal argumentation functions; 3) to explore the difficulties of evaluating the law's argumentative narratives, and 4) to trace some of the anxiety that judges themselves reveal about their roles as storytellers. I conclude that narrative is necessary to law's claims to authority, even as it complicates our understandings about how legislative policy decisions produce effects, and even as judges themselves seek to mask its importance.

William Mathie (Politics, Brock)
"Rhetoric and Reason in the Civil Science of Thomas Hobbes"

In successive versions of Hobbes's political teaching we see a changing account of the nature of rhetoric, or eloquence, and of the dangers it poses for political life. In his Leviathan Hobbes expresses a new confidence that the causes of political dissolution can in principle be entirely eradicated. I argue that Hobbes's new hope is based on his account of the problem of rhetoric and of the solution to that problem developed in Leviathan. I also examine two recent and important accounts of Hobbes's understanding of rhetoric by Quentin Skinner and David Johnston.

Connie Missimer (Seattle, Washington)
"Do the Fallacies you Favor Retard the Growth of Knowledge?"

A simple way to approach fallacies is to ask, "Has reasoning-strategy X retarded or halted the growth of knowledge?" and seek uncontroversial historical support for the fallacy moniker. Historical support also offers a means of retiring reasoning strategies heretofore thought fallacious—they are wrongly accused if they help drive knowledge. Finally, this approach allows us to be more critical of our argumentative practices. Evidence is offered for an Intuitive Fallacy: In its extreme form it rules out the possibility of (contradicting) evidence and in its weaker form it is a non-response to evidence that appears to be a response.

Terri Palmer (English, Carnegie Mellon)
"The Dictates of Reason: Bacon, Ramus, and the Naturalization of Invention"

This paper will discuss the history of argumentation, specifically the location of the canon of invention in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. At that time, scientists, logicians, and philosophers began to seek new means of constructing and presenting arguments. New logical schemes, such as set forth by Ramus in his Logike or Bacon in the Novum Organon, attempted to place the invention and structure of arguments on a more rational, epistemologically secure basis. This paper will explore the shifts in rhetoric and logic in Bacon's and Ramus's work, with some reference to Wilson's Rule of Reason and Art of Rhetoric.

Robert C. Pinto (Philosophy, Windsor)
"Logic, Coherence and Psychology"

This paper will argue that (a) some notion of coherence and/or explanatory coherence is essential to understanding epistemic justification and to clarifying the rational support that our beliefs or commitments lend to each other, and that (b) the requisite notion of coherence cannot be fully explicated on the basis of logic and/or epistemology. Two candidates for explicating coherence will be examined: narrative coherence and the sort of coherence that obtains when gestalt closure is achieved. The paper will attempt to determine under what conditions acceptance that is determined or guided by these sorts of coherence can be construed as rational acceptance.

José Plug (Law, Erasmus)
"Indicators of Obiter Dicta"

In addition to ratio decidendi (the necessary arguments), judges are allowed to include obiter dicta (arguments which are superfluous) in their decisions. The interpretative decision that an argument is superfluous may be justified by reference to the verbal presentation of the argument. In this paper I discuss several words and expressions that, in legal practice, are considered to be indicators of additional considerations. Starting from a pragma-dialectical characterization of additional considerations, I evaluate some examples of these cases in order to examine which words and expressions can be seen as indicators of obiter dicta.

Lawrence H. Powers (Philosophy, Wayne State)
"Ad Hominem Arguments"

Ad hominem arguments (in one sense) argue that some opponent should not be heard and no argument of that opponent should be heard or considered. The opponent has generally pernicious views, false and harmful. Moreover, he is diabolically clever at arguing for his views. Thus, the ad hominem argument is essentially a device by which non-intellectuals try to wrest control of a dialectical situation from intellectuals. Stifling intellectuals, disrupting the dialectical situation, is an unpleasant conclusion, but no fallacy has been shown in what leads up to that conclusion.

Chris Reed and Derek Long (Computer Science, University College, London)
"Persuasion Monologue"

The emphasis in most models of argumentation is placed heavily upon the analysis of dialogue. The current work puts forward an account which examines the argumentation involved in persuasive monologue, drawing upon commitment-based theories of dialogue. The many similarities between monologue and dialogue are examined, and two key differences discussed: that monologue offers an important simplification (hearer commitments need only be modeled statically, rather than requiring dynamic update), and requires one important extension (to account for the frequent use of argumentation based upon predicted counter-argument, a feature not incorporated in the basic PPD game of Walton and Krabbe).

William Rehg (Philosophy, Saint Louis)
"Argumentation Theory and the Recent Philosophy of Science"

Argumentation theory provides a promising heuristic framework for addressing issues raised by the rationality debates in the philosophy of science. I argue first that dichotomies in these debates partly stem from Thomas Kuhn's conception of theory change in science and its view of dialectical standards of argument. A multi-dimensional theory of argumentation open to both the descriptive and normative aspects of argument, however, can provide a framework for interdisciplinary co-operation in the social study of science. I then ask how the problems of rational theory choice might be addressed from a dialectical perspective.

Marco Rühl (French and Romance Linguistics, Freiburg)
"Argument and Authority: On the Pragmatic Basis of Accepting an Appeal to Authority as Rational"

According to an everyday concept of 'argumentation' the presence of authority rules out the possibility for argumentation. However, in the case of appeal to authority, e.g., argumentation and authority coexist. The analysis of (idealized) teacher-and-student interactions shows that a teacher's utterances are critically evaluated by the students, although these may lack relevant knowledge for adequate evaluation. Therefore, a dialogical concept of argument acceptability, related to a conception of a genuine argumentativity of language use, is introduced which (i) states that acceptability is connected to the knowledge/information available to an addressee, and (ii) can account for why appeals to authority are accepted as rational arguments.

Bruce A. Russell (Philosophy, Wayne State)
"Good Arguments and Fallacies"

To understand what a fallacy is one needs to understand what a bad argument is and what it is for an argument to appear good. I will argue that from an intuitive standpoint a good argument should be understood in roughly the way Richard Feldman has proposed, that is, as an argument that gives people reason to believe its conclusion. However, I will also argue that an externalist condition that requires that the premises really do support the conclusion must be added to the internalist account which only requires that a person be justified in believing the premises support the conclusion.

Marie Secor (English, Penn State)
"Mill's Fallacies: Theory and Examples"

In noting contemporary neglect of Mill's work on fallacy, Hansen and Pinto say that his account is tied more closely to scientific methodology than to problems of public discourse and everyday argumentation. This paper re-examines Mill's fallacies from a rhetorical perspective, assessing the extent to which his examples—drawn from the domain of popular superstition, science, philosophy, and public discussion—fits his theoretical structure. In articulating the relationship between Mill's philosophical assumptions and the discursive practices of the fields from which he draws his examples, it will suggest the ambiguities in Mill's mentalistic, rationalistic, inductivist approach and the inescapable rhetoricity of his examples.

Christina Slade (Communication, Canberra and New York)
"From a Critical Point of View: News as Soap Opera"

Traditionally, reasoning skills have been taught through written examples, often anachronistic or artificial. However, students use television as their major source of information about the world and as the source of basic understanding of the world. Yet we rarely provide students with the skills directly to criticize and analyze television's world view. This paper reports on a project designed to teach reasoning through the critical analysis of real television products. News presentation is shown to be influenced by the stereotypes and oversimplification of the genre of soap opera, to the detriment of balance.

A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans (Speech Communication, Amsterdam)
"Verbal Indicators of Argumentation and Explanation"

Linguistic descriptions (markers) of textual relations are not always immediately relevant for providing guidelines for the analysis of argumentative discourse. An important reason for this is that in linguistic descriptions, because linguists are not particularly interested in argumentation, usually no distinction is made between argumentative and explanatory relations. The paper argues that more information about indicators of argumentative and explanatory relations can be gained by combining linguistic insight concerning the use of certain verbal expressions with contextual clues concerning the performance of the speech acts of arguing and explaining.

Lawrence G. Souder (Speech Communication, Temple)
"A Way to Describe and Evaluate Thought Experiments, or Trying to Get a Grip on Virtual Reality"

The use of thought experiments seem to provoke much controversy, often in the form of charges of appeals to intuition. The notion of intuition, however, is vaguely defined in both the context of thought experiments and in philosophy in general. This vagueness suggests that the description of thought experiments is incomplete, and thus the prospect for their evaluation remains unfulfilled. I try to show that van Eemeren and Grootendorst's pragma-dialectical model provides a framework for analyzing thought experiments and evaluating them because it treats thought experiments as part of a dialogue and as the result of a perspective.

Christopher Thomson (Philosophy, Toronto)
"On the 'Burdens' of Proof in Ordinary Language Argumentation"

Various textbooks in logic and rhetoric seem content to treat the notion of the burden of proof as if it were a simple obligation associated with the act of proffering statements for another's consideration. Nevertheless, we can uncover cases in argumentation where both sides champion statements but only one side bears a burden of proof. I believe that an explanation for this difference in emphasis will involve distinguishing between two different (but not unrelated) burdens of proof that can come to bear in the course of an argument.

Mark Vorobej (Philosophy, McMaster)
"Fallacies on Film"

This paper explores the question of how films may be used to enhance the teaching of fallacies. Theoretical questions about the nature of fallacies will be addressed along with pedagogical issues. The paper is structured around a case study—an examination of various arguments from ignorance as articulated by fictional characters in the 1964 Hammer horror production of The Gorgon.

John Woods (Philosophy, Lethbridge)
"The Normative Impotence of Ideal Models"

In the methodology of theory construction, the concept of "intuitions" is commonly assigned a central role. This is especially true of philosophical and social scientific theories or rational human agency. An equally important trait of such accounts is the theorist's employment of "ideal models" or rational agency. It is frequently supposed that the concept of intuitions and the concept of ideal models link in such a way as to give rise to a coherent and load-bearing notion of "objective normativity." This paper shows, with reference to a wide range of contemporary theories, (a) that the employment of ideal models is otiose, and (b) that the supposedly related concept of objective normativity is groundless.

Robert J. Yanal (Philosophy, Wayne State)
"Argument and Conviction"

Shouldn't we be convinced by good (valid) arguments and not by bad ones? But there are valid arguments with true premises that are not known to be true. What we minimally expect is that people follow the logic of the argument. How will they do this? Descartes advised us to perceive clearly and distinctly the steps in the argument. Aristotle looked toward the enthymeme so that the audience would draw the conclusion on their own. These 'thinking through' strategies are an aid to conviction but cannot guarantee it. Do we need the fallacies and other dirty tricks of rhetoric after all?